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CASE COMMENTS
The Roman court determined that the protection of individual rights
requires strict compliance with the announcement rule. But requiring
literal compliance with the knock and announce statute in the face
of substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt may justify the fear
expressed by some that the major effect of the exclusionary rule is
to let the guilty go unpunished. The exclusionary rule has never been
interpreted to extend to all proceedings or persons who have been
victims of illegal entries or searches, nor should it be.56 The announce-
ment requirements developed as a means of effectuating fourth amend-
ment rights. In turn, the exclusionary rule was applied to ensure that
law enforcement officers would comply with the announcement require-
ments. Thus the mandate of the exclusionary rule is twice removed
from the constitutional guarantees it seeks to protect. The rule might
be worth its cost, i.e. letting the guilty go free, if, as its proponents
argue, it is the "only effective deterrent to police misconduct." 51 How-
ever, in light of increasing evidence that it does not fulfill this pur-
pose, serious doubts arise as to its application. 5 Application of the
rule should be limited to situations where it most efficaciously serves
to protect individual privacy, preserve property, or prevent violence.
When these purposes are not served by application of the exclusionary
rule, other remedies for violations of constitutional rights should be
sought. 59
JOSLYN WILSON
Insurance - "OTHER INSURANCE" PROVISIONS - CONFLICTING ESCAPE
CLAUSES IN CONCURRENT AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICIES ARE VOID.-
World Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Stauffer, 306 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974).
Defendant Clarence Maurer was involved in an automobile accident
while driving a rental car owned by codefendant World Rent-A-Car,
Inc. He was covered by an omnibus clause in the rental agency's policy
657 (1926). See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38-41 (1963); id. at 54-60 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960) ("[A] claim
under 18 U.S.C. § 3109 depends upon the particular circumstances surrounding the
[entry]."); State v. Hetzko, 283 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
56. See cases cited note 11 supra.
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
58. See note 13 supra.
59. For discussion of alternative remedies see notes 23, 24 supra. The Roman court
may have been influenced by (1) the widespread opinion that possession of marijuana
is not (or should not be) a serious offense, (2) the traditional isolation of a college
campus from the surrounding community, and (3) the extravagant manner in which
the arrest was accomplished.
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and a drive-other-cars clause in his own automobile policy. At trial,
however, both the driver's and the owner's insurers disclaimed all
liability under similar "non-coverage" provisions.' In effect, each
policy provided that it would not apply if any other valid and col-
lectible insurance was available to the defendant. The trial court
held that the driver's insurer had successfully disclaimed liability and
dismissed it from the action. The rental agency and its insurer, Chicago
Insurance Company, appealed this ruling.
The Second District Court of Appeal found the issue to be whether
both policies' escape clauses should be given effect or neither,2 reject-
ing the trial court's decision that only the lessor's insurer should be
liable. Relying heavily on a 1971 Mississippi case involving similar
facts, 3 the court concluded that the two escape clauses were mutually
repugnant and void. The district court then remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its finding that coverage should
be "afforded fully under both policies." 4
Because insurance companies have expanded their coverage in re-
cent years to include parties other than the named insured, a person
is often covered for the same risk by two separate insurance policies.
The insurance companies were quick to take advantage of such situa-
tions by including in the policies "other insurance" clauses to reduce
or avoid liability.5 These clauses are of three types: excess clauses, pro-
1. The driver's policy from State Farm Mutual contained the following language:
[A]Il coverages are subject to the following:
(b) The insurance with respect to ....
(iii) a non-owned automobile, owned by any person or organization engaged
in the automobile business, shall not apply to any liability or loss against
which the insured or the owner of such vehicle has other collectible insurance
applicable in whole or in part.
World Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Stauffer, 306 So. 2d 131, 131-32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(emphasis omitted). The language in the rental agency's policy was:
The term contingent insured shall mean any person or organization while
using a rental vehicle with the permission of the owner, provided his actual opera-
tion or (if he is not operating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope
of such permission, but:
(a) only if no other valid and collectible insurance, whether primary, excess
or contingent, with the limits of liability at least equal to the applicable
financial responsibility limit is available to such person ....
Id. at 132.
2. 306 So. 2d at 132.
3. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chappell, 246 So. 2d 498 (Miss. 1971).
4. 306 So. 2d at 133.
5. See J. APPLEMAN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANcE 324 (1938); R. KEETON, IN-
SURANCE LAW § 3.11(a) (1971); Russ, The Double Insurance Problem-A Proposal, 13
HASTINGs L.J. 183 (1961); Note, Concurrent Coverage in Automobile Liability Insurance,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (1965); Comment, Double Insurance Coverage in Automobile
Insurance Policies-The Problem of "Other Insurance" Clauses, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1039
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ration clauses, and escape clauses. An excess clause limits the in-
surer's liability to any excess after the primary insurer has paid to
the limits of its policy.6 A proration clause distributes liability between
the two companies on a stated basis, usually according to policy
limits. 7 An escape clause, the type involved in the instant case, at-
tempts to disclaim all liability where the insured is covered by another
valid policy."
Due to the popularity of these provisions, especially in automobile
liability insurance, concurrent policies often contain one or more
conflicting "other insurance" clauses.9 In approaching such a conflict,
the courts generally apply three basic principles. First, the insured
must not be deprived of protection because of the fortuity of double
protection.10 Secondly, the insured is not entitled to recover more
than his actual damages.- Finally, the intent of the insurer, as
evidenced by the language of the policy, should be honored if
possible.12
When faced with conflicting "other insurance" provisions courts
have apportioned liability in a variety of ways. Following the rationale
of Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v. Cochran Oil
Mill & Ginnery Co., 3 an old property case, the early decisions found
one of the insurers primarily liable.14 In determining which party was
(1973). Property insurance policies were the first to contain "other insurance" clauses.
Such clauses quickly became popular in automobile, health, medical and accident in-
surance. 16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 62:36 (2d ed. 1959); R. KEETON,
supra, § 3.11(a), at 170.
The original purpose of "other insurance" clauses was to reduce the temptation to
over-insure property and then destroy it. This rationale does not seem as applicable to
automobile liability insurance as to property insurance, although there is some possibility
of collusion among insured drivers. It has been suggested that the real reason for the
use of these provisions is the desire on the part of insurance companies to limit or
eliminate their share of the liability when concurrent coverage exists. Russ, supra, at
183-84.
6. See R. KEETON, supra note 5, § 3.11(a).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. There are, of course, six different combinations of the different provisions: excess-
excess, excess-prorata, excess-escape, pro-rata-pro-rata, pro-rata-escape and escape-
escape. For a discussion of the handling of these situations in other jurisdictions see Note,
Supra note 5.
10. 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4913 (3d ed. 1962); APPLEMAN,
supra note 5, at 321.
11. Cone v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 135 So. 142 (Fla. 1931); FLA. STAT. § 631.61(2) (1973);
8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 4911.
12. J. I. Kelly Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 47 So. 742 (Fla. 1908);
16 G. CoucH, supra note 5, § 62:44.
13. 105 S.E. 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921).
14. See Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect of Double Coverage and
"Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 MINN. L. REV. 838, 841-47 (1954).
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primarily liable, the courts followed mechanical tests, such as which
policy was issued first, 15 or which was more specific in defining the
risk.1"
In later cases many courts have concluded that no real justification
exists for choosing between the policies, and have in certain situations
found the clauses to be mutually repugnant and void.17 There is a
split of authority on how to apportion liability after this determina-
tion has been made. The minority of jurisdictions, after abrogating
the conflicting clauses, returns to the primary liability doctrine."' Juris-
dictions following the minority approach use two bases for determining
which policy is primary: ownership of the automobile 19 and identity
of the primary tortfeasor.20 When the owner's insurance is held to be
primary, the driver's insurer is liable only after the owner's coverage
has been exhausted. The reasoning underlying this approach is that
the primary insurer's "other insurance" provision never comes into
play because the secondary policy is not "valid, collectible" insurance.2 1
The majority view is that if the "other insurance" clauses are void,
then the problem should be treated as if neither clause were present. 2
In such a case liability would be prorated, usually according to the
limits on the policies.2 3
15. E.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d
653 (6th Cir. 1940).
16. E.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Cochran Oil Mill & Ginnery
Co., 105 S.E. 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921).
17. One of the leading cases adopting this viewpoint is Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952).
18. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 4912; 16 G. COUCH, supra note 5, §§ 62:78,
:81; Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 1966 INS. L.J. 151; Comment, supra note
5, at 1041. Watson suggests that instead of placing full liability on the primary insurer,
courts first decide who should bear the liability and then label that party the primary
insurer. Watson, supra, at 154.
19. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chappell, 246 So. 2d 498, 505 (Miss. 1971);
16 G. COUCH, supra note 5, § 62:60.
20. See cases discussed in 16 G. COUCH, supra note 5, § 62:64.
21. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 10, § 4914; 16 G. COUCH, supra note 5, § 62:60.
22. The majority view is represented by Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952). Cf. Zurich General Accident & Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 1941):
We think the logic of this reasoning is made apparent by assuming that neither
of the policies contained an "other insurance" provision, or that both policies
contained an "other insurance" provision in exactly the same language. It could
not be seriously argued, in our opinion, but that under either of such situations
the two insurers would be liable in proportion to the amount of insurance
provided by their respective policies.
23. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. General Mut. Ins. Co., 210 So. 2d
688 (Ala. 1968); Rocky Mt. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 474 P.2d 38 (Ariz. App.
1970); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So. 2d 750 (La. App.
1966); Arditi v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 315 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1958); Continental
[Vol. 3
CASE COMMENTS
Courts often find that the intent of the insurer can be determined
if one or both policies contain a proration clause in addition to the
conflicting clauses.2 4 In most cases, however, no clear intent is dis-
cernible and the courts must determine which of the solutions dis-
cussed above best serves public policy. Where both parties attempt
to disclaim or limit their liability, it has been suggested that pro-
ration has the effect of approximating what the parties would have
intended had they foreseen the problem.25 While it is true that each
insurer would rather be partially liable than primarily liable,
each insurer's real preference is to escape liability entirely. Thus, it
is misleading to speak in terms of unexpressed "intent."
As a matter of public policy, both solutions-proration and de-
signation of a primary insurer-can be supported. It is basic that
the payment of premiums entitles the insured to insurance coverage.
An owner with an omnibus clause pays for coverage when another is
driving his car. The driver also pays for coverage when he is using
another's vehicle. Proration would assure that both insurers meet
their contractual obligations and is possibly the best solution for the
insured and his insurer.2 '
The policy behind using a primary-excess designation differs de-
pending on which party is ultimately held liable. The unarticulated
reason for placing liability on the owner seems to be the belief that
he is better able financially to meet the burden and protect the in-
jured party. However, a financial responsibility rationale does not
seem to have any application to a conflict between multiple insurers,
where the central issue is which insurer will pay and how much.2 7
Cas. Co. v. Buckey Union Cas. Co., 143 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio 1957); Hardware Dealers
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969).
Some jurisdictions base the proration on the premium paid, Insurance Co. of Texas
v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal. 1958), while others require
the insurers to share equally in payment of the judgment, Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1974); Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v.
Schapiro & Whitehouse, Inc., 269 A.2d 826 (Md. 1970).
See also R. KEETON, supra note 5, § 3.11(b); 69 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1960; Note, supra
note 5, at 325-26; Comment, supra note 5, at 1049-54.
24. See, e.g., Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of America v. Continental Cas. Co., 267
F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1959); Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 163 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. Fla. 1958). In St. Paul Mercury, the court gave effect
to a proration clause in one policy although it was not actually applicable to the
factual situation involved. See Note, supra note 5, at 325 n.40.
25. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 143 N.E.2d 169, 180
(Ohio 1957), in which the court held that there was no basis for "court created" primary
insurance where both policies contained identical "other insurance" clauses. See also
Note, supra note 5, at 325; Note, supra note 14, at 850.
26. Note, supra note 14, at 850.
27. To insure that an injured party will receive compensation the Florida Legislature
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Assuming that primary liability must be imposed on one of the parties,
it seems reasonable that it should be imposed on the tortfeasor, with-
out whose negligence the accident would not have occurred.28 This
rule would recognize that fault is the basis of liability. However, the
primary tortfeasor rule does not cover a negligent party who is not
the named insured in either policy 29 and has been adopted only rarely.30
The Stauffer court found the problem of apportioning liability
between policies containing conflicting escape clauses to be one of
first impression in Florida.31 The Florida Supreme Court has, how-
ever, considered a conflict between excess clauses12 and some authori-
ties have found the two situations sufficiently analogous to justify
similar treatment. 3 The supreme court, recognizing the danger of
depriving the insured of coverage if both clauses were given effect,
held both excess clauses void.3 4 The district court in Stauffer reached
the same result when dealing with escape clauses by relying on Travel-
ers Indemnity Co. v. Chappell,35 a Mississippi Supreme Court case.
After deciding that the mutual escape provisions were void, the
district court failed to specify clearly the method of apportioning
liability between the two insurers. The Stauffer court simply quoted
with approval from the Travelers opinion and, in apparent reference
to the result reached in Travelers, stated, "Coverage was afforded fully
under both policies. We concur."3
adopted a financial responsibility act, FLA. STAT. §§ 324.011-.251 (1973), and an automobile
reparations reform act, FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1973), which established a system of
no-fault automobile insurance.
28. See APPLEMAN, supra note 5, at 325. Appleman would impose liability on the
driver, reasoning that the omnibus clause in the owner's policy is only a courtesy to the
owner's permittees and should not be used when the driver has other insurance. It should
be noted, however, that this argument was made before any American court had
grappled with the issue and Appleman's view does not seem to have been widely
adopted. See also 16 G. CoucH, supra note 5, § 62:64.
29. Russ, supra note 5, at 184-85.
30. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 326 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1964).
31. 306 So. 2d at 133.
32. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 775 (Fla.
1973).
33. See Ford, Concurrent Coverage Controversies, in PRAc~rIING LAW INSnTUTE,
AUToMOBILE INSURANCE PROBLEMs 59, 67 (1968); Note, supra note 5, at 326. There seems
to be little reason to treat the situations differently at least insofar as finding the clauses
mutually repugnant.
34. 277 So. 2d at 777. Cf. Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1954),
in which the court found an escape clause was not contrary to public policy so long
as the defendant was covered by another policy, the implication being that mutual
escape clauses leaving the public unprotected would not be given effect.
35. 246 So. 2d 498 (Miss. 1971).
36. 306 So. 2d at 133.
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In Travelers an auto repair garage loaned a customer an automo-
bile that was later involved in an accident. The customer was covered
by her policy and one taken out by the garage. The policies had "other
insurance" clauses which were almost identical to those in the instant
case. The Mississippi court found the clauses mutually repugnant 7
and held that the insurer of the auto repair garage was primarily
liable since the garage owned the car.38 The driver's insurer was thus
liable only for amounts in excess of the garage's policy limits.
The Mississippi approach could be justified under present Florida
law. If it is the result intended in Stauffer, it is curious that the district
court failed to state its position clearly. Since the Florida Supreme
Court's 1920 decision in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson,3 9 the
automobile has been considered a "dangerous instrumentality" in
Florida. This classification imposes liability on the owner of an auto-
mobile for injuries caused while another is driving it. 4° Dictum in an-
other supreme court case, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.,41 indicates that while the dangerous in-
strumentality doctrine is not dispositive of the issue of liability, it is
37. 246 So. 2d at 504.
38. Id. at 505.
39. 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).
40. See Rouse v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1072 (M.D. Fla. 1973),
rev'd, 506 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1975); Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla.
1972); Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959); accord, Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.E.2d 686 (Mass. 1972).
In Rouse, Greyhound Rent-a-Car delivered one of its used rental cars to Lakeland
Automobile Auction to be sold at wholesale. Lakeland Automobile Auction allowed
defendant Cobb, with whom it maintained a business association, to make use of the
car. While Cobb was using the car on a pleasure trip he was involved in an accident
causing death and injuries. The court found all three parties to be liable: Cobb as
driver of the car, Lakeland Automobile Auction as bailee of the auto, and Greyhound
as legal owner. The issue was then how to apportion liability among the respective
insurers:
Florida case law has established the principle that the carrier for the owner
is primarily liable and has no right of indemnification from the driver of the
vehicle or its carrier. . . . As this Court understands the Roth opinion, it is
based on the policy of Florida law as developed in the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine to require an owner to provide financial responsibility for his motor
vehicles ....
369 F. Supp. at 1076 (citations omitted). The court then found that both Greyhound
and Lakeland Automobile Auction were "owners" for the purpose of apportioning
liability and were primarily and jointly liable in proportion to their respective policy
limits. The driver's insurer was liable only as an excess insurer. Id. at 1076-77.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that the auction company was
not an "owner." Thus Greyhound alone was primarily liable and the other two de-
fendants were excess insurers. 506 F.2d at 415.
41. 277 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1973).
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certainly a factor to be considered. 42 While some Florida cases have
prorated liability, it seems clear that those results were reached be-
cause of an additional proration clause in one of the policies 43 or be-
cause both insured parties were considered owners.4 4
It is not clear that the Mississippi approach is the result desired
by the Stauffer court. Clearly that solution would not result in "full
coverage" under both policies. This language would reasonably in-
dicate some type of proration, and would be in accord with the ma-
jority view in the United States.45 In addition, the attorneys for
petitioner's insurer believe that proration is the correct interpreta-
tion of the court's opinion. 6
The ambiguity of the decision results in confusion and uncertainty
in this area of the law. To a certain extent, any precedent in this
field is of limited value because of the importance of the precise
language of the policies and the facts involved in each case. But the
failure of the Stauffer court to state its position clearly cannot be ex-
cused by the lack of precedent or confusing facts. A clear guide to the
road Florida will follow in resolving "other insurance" problems must
await future decisions.
MARY F. CLARK
ProceSS-PERSONAL SERVICE OF LEGISLATIVE WITNESS SUBPOENA DOES
NOT CONFER IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION ON CIRCUIT COURT IN PRO-
CEEDINGS To ENFORCE THAT SUBPOENA.-Bussey v. Legislative Audit-
ing Committee, 298 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
304 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1974).
On August 27, 1973, in a sixth floor hallway of a Tampa office
building, Robert N. Bussey was offered a witness subpoena by an
agent of the Florida Legislative Auditing Committee. Bussey was
accompanied by his attorney, who, at his request, accepted the sub-
42. Id. at 777.
43. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1967);
Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of America v. Continental Cas. Co., 267 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.
1959); Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp.
325 (S.D. Fla. 1958).
44. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 277 So. 2d 775 (Fla.
1973).
45. See notes 22, 23 and accompanying text supra.
46. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, World Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Stauffer, No.
46,908 (Fla. filed Feb. 13, 1975): "The result of [the Second District's] ruling, if given
effect, would mean that each insurance company would respond to the Plaintiff's
damages pro tanto."
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